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The law of tying arrangements as it stands does not correspond with 
modern economic analysis. Therefore, and because tying arrangements 
are so widely common, the law is expected to change and extensive aca-
demic writing is currently attempting to guide its way. 
In tying arrangements, monopolistic firms coerce consumers to buy 
additional products or services beyond what they intended to purchase.1 
This pressure can be applied because a consumer in a monopolistic mar-
ket does not have the alternative to buy the product or service from a 
competing firm. In the absence of such choice, the monopolistic firm can 
allegedly force the additional purchase on the consumer at non-beneficial 
terms. The “tying product” is the one the consumer wants to buy, and the 
product the firm attaches to the tying product is termed the “tied prod-
uct.”2 
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 1. In a competitive market, consumers can choose to buy from firms that do not tie products, as 
opposed to ones that do. The tying firm, in such a case, would then lose out. At the same time, it is 
possible that in a competitive market, some products would still be offered together because it would 
be beneficial to both producers and consumers. 
 2. It can sometimes be difficult to differentiate between the tying of two separate products and 
the sale of two components forming a single whole product. For example, does selling a pair of shoes 
(instead of selling each shoe separately) constitute tying? Clearly, almost every product is comprised 
of a number of components. If, as a result, we treat most existing products as having within them-
selves a tying of products, then imposing restrictions on this sort of tying would be very burdensome 
on markets. Therefore, tying is commonly defined as where two separate products, with separate 
demand, are sold together. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 19 
(1984); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND 
ITS PRACTICE 453–54 (4th ed. 2011); David E. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle 
and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 
37, 42 (2005). Because there is almost no demand for single shoes, selling a pair of shoes does not 
constitute tying. However, it is important to note that even this definition is not free of concern, since 
in many cases products that at a certain time are considered separate and have separate demand may 
in time become one product in consumers’ minds. Cellular phones illustrate this situation well, as 
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In principle, there are three ways to tie products: (1) Contractual ty-
ing, which, as the name implies, takes place when the monopolistic firm 
requires the buyer in the purchase agreement to purchase the tied product 
as well; (2) Technical tying, which occurs when the monopolistic firm 
technically links the tying product and the tied product together so that 
the consumer is forced to purchase both of them;3 and (3) Tying through 
“economic coercion,” which takes place when the monopolistic firm 
offers both products, the tying and the tied, together, at a discount so sig-
nificant that it actually negates the consumer’s economic freedom not to 
purchase the tied product.4 
The historical concern regarding tying arrangements was that a firm 
holding monopoly power would charge a monopolistic price for the tied 
product as well as for the tying product, thus leveraging its power into an 
additional market.5 Another concern was that the tying arrangement 
would create a significant barrier to entry into the markets of both prod-
ucts, since potential competitors might, due to the tying, be required to 
enter both markets in parallel.6 Thus, the monopolistic firm could theo-
retically extend its period of monopoly. These concerns led the Supreme 
Court to impose severe restrictions on tying arrangements employed by 
monopolistic firms.7 However, as will be shown, modern economic anal-
ysis reveals that the concern was probably exaggerated, and more im-
portantly, that tying arrangements may have significant pro-competitive 
efficiency justifications. 
Part II will present a comprehensive economic analysis that demon-
strates that tying arrangements, despite their anticompetitive potential, 
also hold exceedingly significant pro-competitive efficiency potential. 
Part II will then review and critique the current law relating to tying ar-
rangements. 
In Part III, I will present the potential legal rules for analyzing tying 
arrangements and the two leading approaches in academic writing re-
garding their appropriate implementation—the approach of the Chicago-
                                                                                                                       
they currently include such devices as cameras, music players, alarm clocks, calendars, and more. 
Obviously, when the camera was first added to the cellular phone, these were two separate products, 
each of which had separate demand. Now, since it appears that there is probably no longer any de-
mand (certainly not significant demand) for cellular phones without cameras, according to the defini-
tion they would be seen as two components of one product. For a discussion regarding “new” prod-
ucts, see, for example, HOVENKAMP, supra, at 454–55. 
 3. The monopolistic firm designs the products so that the consumer is forced to purchase both 
the tying and the tied products. 
 4. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 448–53. 
 5. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 6. See infra Part II.B.2(b). 
 7. See infra Part III. 
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Harvard Schools and the approach of Professor Einer Elhauge.8 In Part 
IV, I will discuss various tying scenarios and present my position regard-
ing their appropriate legal analyses. In concurrence with the Chicago-
Harvard Schools’ approach, I support the implementation of the legal per 
se rule for tying arrangements that do not foreclose the tied product’s 
market. However, for tying arrangements that do foreclose the tied prod-
uct’s market, I will propose, based on economic theory and empirical 
evidence, the implementation of a rule of reason analysis that does not 
raise a presumption against the tying arrangement.  
Lastly, Part V will conclude the discussion. 
II. ECONOMIC REVIEW 
The first section of this Part presents the historical theory and eco-
nomic analysis that led to imposing restrictions on tying arrangements. 
This review focuses on the development of the leverage theory from its 
inception to the present day. In the second section of the Part, I will re-
view the possible incentives for using tying arrangements according to 
modern economic analysis. Tying arrangements may promote distinct 
efficiency outcomes in many cases, but in others, they can lead to the 
realization of monopolistic and anticompetitive effects. In addition, there 
are several tying arrangement scenarios that could have benign or mixed 
outcomes. The third section of this Part further details the controversy 
between the theorists of the Chicago and Harvard Schools and Professor 
Elhauge on the issue of the potential benefit versus the potential damage 
entailed in tying arrangements. 
                                                     
 8. The review will demonstrate that there are tying scenarios where both approaches present 
similar legal positions, while in other scenarios, a significant gap between them remains. When tying 
the products does not lead to a significant closure of the tied product market, the Chicago-Harvard 
School proposes determining that the tying should be legal per se. In contrast, Professor Elhauge 
suggests that the legal per se rule should only apply when the tied product market is not foreclosed 
and while the tying and the tied products are tied in fixed proportions. When the tying is not of a 
fixed ratio, Professor Elhauge advocates the implementation of the “quasi-per se” rule, whereby the 
tying firm should bear the onus of proving competitive justifications for its implementation. In tying 
scenarios leading to a significant closure of the tied product market, both approaches suggest apply-
ing a presumption that the tying arrangement harms competition. Thus, the tying firm must provide 
efficiency justifications in order for the arrangement not to be prohibited. Some of the Chicago 
School theorists, however, advocate applying the legal per se standard to all tying arrangements, 
including those foreclosing the tied product market. See infra Part IV. 
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A. The Leverage Theory—Historical Review 
1. The Leverage of Monopoly Power 
The leverage theory has largely determined the legal restrictions on 
using tying arrangements.9 According to this theory, the monopolistic 
firm ties the products together so it can extract a double monopolistic 
profit for both the tying product and the tied product.10 The harm to 
competition, according to the leverage theory, is twofold. First, the lever-
age enables the monopolistic firm to extract a monopolistic profit in an 
additional market. Second, it excludes firms from the tied product mar-
ket, or at least from the segment of the market taken over by the tying 
firm. 
2. The Single Monopoly Profit Theory 
With the development of the Chicago School, theorists raised the 
argument that the leverage of monopolistic power is not plausible due to 
the single monopoly profit theory.11 According to this theory, a firm with 
monopolistic power in a particular product market cannot increase the 
monopolistic profit it already earns through tying an additional product.12 
For example, assume that the manufacturing cost of bolts is 10 cents per 
unit, the manufacturing cost of nuts is similar, and that a monopolistic 
manufacturer of both products charges an optimal monopolistic price of 
40 cents for both together. In this scenario, the monopolistic manufactur-
er makes a total monopolistic profit of 20 cents. Now let us assume an 
alternate scenario in which the nut market is competitive and hence, the 
price of each nut is 10 cents (since in a competitive market, the product’s 
price equals its manufacturing cost). In this scenario, the monopolistic 
manufacturer, who produces both bolts and nuts, can charge a price of 30 
cents for each bolt, so that a set of one bolt and one nut will cost 40 
cents, thus earning 20 cents as a monopolistic profit.13 
                                                     
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. For a review of the leverage theory, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: 
A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 365–66 (rev. ed. 1993) (1978); HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 
420–21; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 197 (2nd ed. 2001). 
 11. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. 
REV. 925, 926 (1979). 
 12. See BORK, supra note 10, at 372–75; POSNER, supra note 10, at 197–99; Ward S. Bow-
man, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20–23 (1957); Aaron 
Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 281, 290–92 
(1956); Posner, supra note 11, at 926; Keith K. Wollenberg, An Economic Analysis of Tie-In Sales: 
Re-examining the Leverage Theory, 39 STAN. L. REV. 737 (1987). 
 13. This example is taken from Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the 
Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 403–04 (2009). 
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Therefore, the monopolistic profit for the combination of bolts and 
nuts is the same as the monopolistic profit for bolts alone. Consequently, 
a monopolistic manufacturer of bolts cannot make an additional monopo-
listic profit even if it ties the sale of bolts to the sale of nuts.14 A few of 
the Chicago School theorists, based on this theory, have concluded that 
the reasoning behind tying arrangements must be pro-competitive, and 
therefore they ought to be legal per se.15 
3. Post-Chicago Writing: Scenarios in Which Leveraging Monopolistic 
Power May Be Possible 
After the single monopoly profit theory was introduced, Post-
Chicago School theorists started presenting various economic models to 
explain how firms could increase their monopolistic profits through tying 
(this refers to profits not resulting from improved efficiency).16 Certain 
models demonstrate how firms can leverage monopolistic power to the 
tied product market, given certain circumstances, and other models illus-
trate how the monopolistic firm can increase its monopolistic profits in 
the tying product market. 
Leveraging monopolistic power and extracting additional monopo-
listic profit in the tied product market may be possible under the follow-
ing circumstances: 
• the tied product has a usage complementary to the tying prod-
uct, but also an independent usage; 
• size possesses a dimension of efficiency in the tied product 
market; and 
• the tying leads to a significant closure of the tied product  mar-
ket. 
Let us assume that all three conditions are met in the following ex-
ample. A monopolistic manufacturer of machines that inject salt into 
cans of food forces the machines’ users to purchase the salt in combina-
tion with the machine.17 The machine is the tying product and the tied 
                                                     
 14. Moreover, it would be worthwhile for the monopolistic manufacturer of bolts for competi-
tion to exist in the nuts market. Let us assume that the competition in the nuts market led to a reduc-
tion in the price of each nut to 5 cents (due to increased production efficiency). In this situation, the 
monopolistic manufacturer of bolts would raise the price to 35 cents per bolt, so that the price of a 
set would remain 40 cents, but now the manufacturer’s monopolistic profit increases to 25 cents. See 
BORK, supra note 10, at 373; W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. 
VERNON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 267 (4th ed. 2005) [hereinafter VISCUSI 
ET AL.]. 
 15. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 10, at 380–81. 
 16. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 13; VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 14. 
 17. This example is loosely based on the circumstances of Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 
U.S. 392 (1947), which will be discussed infra Part III. 
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product is the salt. In this example, competing salt manufacturers will 
lose size efficiency due to the tying, and therefore may be driven out of 
the market. Alternatively, they may continue producing salt, but at lower 
efficiency and hence at higher costs. Consequently, the tying firm could 
charge consumers, whose demand for salt is independent of and separate 
from the demand for the machines, supra-competitive prices.18 
Another possible leverage scenario arises in the context of “subse-
quent” products. In this scenario, a monopolistic product is expected to 
be replaced by a next-generation product. Therefore, the monopolistic 
firm may tie its product to the next-generation product so that when the 
upgraded product becomes established, the firm’s monopolistic power 
transfers to the new product.19 This is not a simultaneous leverage of 
monopolistic power enabling a monopolistic profit to be made for two 
separate products in parallel, but rather the leverage of “subsequent” mo-
nopolistic power from the present to the future product market.20 
B. The Various Economic Incentives for Tying Arrangements 
As stated above, it was due to the leverage theory that the re-
strictions upon tying arrangements were originally imposed. Today, 
modern economic analysis grants significance to additional rationales for 
implementing tying arrangements. This section will review the efficient 
pro-competitive, the anticompetitive, and the ambiguous rationales. 
1. Pro-Competitive and Efficiency-Promoting Tying Arrangements 
In this subsection we will extensively review the scenarios in which 
the purpose of the tying is to increase efficiency. These scenarios support 
the argument that the legal restrictions imposed upon tying arrangements 
should be reduced. 
(a). Tying as a Means of Improving the Product 
Many tying arrangements (especially technical tying arrangements) 
improve the tying product or create a new, upgraded one. Until a few 
years ago, for example, cellular phones were just phones. Now, the de-
vice also includes a camera, a video camera, the ability to surf the inter-
net, and more. All of these new additional functions have turned the de-
vice into an upgraded one that consumers prefer. This sort of tying, based 
on the desire to create an improved product, likely plays a central role in 
                                                     
 18. See Elhauge, supra note 13, at 413–17; VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 14, at 278–85. 
 19. See Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and 
Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194 (2002). 
 20. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 461; Carlton & Waldman, supra note 19. 
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high technology and new economy markets. These areas of industry—in 
which innovation and investment in research and development are very 
high—are characterized by the upgrading and integration of various 
products, functions, and features. Therefore, in principle, the widespread 
technical tying of products benefits consumers and the economy.21 
(b). Tying as a Means of Saving Production Costs 
It is often cheaper to join or combine products during the manufac-
turing process.22 For example, when manufacturing vehicles, it is pre-
sumably cheaper and easier to install windshield wipers, air conditioners, 
radio systems, and spare tires in the production line assembly. In the 
past, the car could be purchased without these features, but today it is 
cheaper to get them all at once than to add them one at a time. In addi-
tion, it is often not economically worthwhile for the manufacturer to set 
up several production lines to give the consumer the option to buy the car 
with or without the tied product. Also, the tying may lead to maximizing 
size efficiency if, as a result, the quantity produced by the manufacturer 
of both the tying and the tied products increases.23 
(c). Tying as a Means of Reducing Marketing Costs 
Tying products and marketing them together can also reduce their 
overall marketing costs. One example is an electronic product manufac-
turer that has to decide whether to market the product together with the 
batteries required for its operation. If the manufacturer is required to of-
fer consumers both the option of purchasing the product with the batter-
ies and also the option of purchasing it without the batteries, the prod-
uct’s marketing costs may rise significantly. This is because a double 
marketing system for these two options would involve additional costs in 
handling, packaging, storing, shipping, maintaining a constant supply of 
both options, and so on.24 In other cases, combining the marketing of two 
products saves internal administrative costs simply because it might be 
cheaper to unify the customer service system so that it provides solutions 
to the range of services or products marketed.25 
                                                     
 21. See, e.g., VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 14, at 276–80. For further discussion, see, for 
example, BORK, supra note 10, at 378–79. 
 22. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 10, at 378–79; Evans & Salinger, supra note 2, at 52–66. 
 23. BORK, supra note 10, at 378–79; see also PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR 
APPLICATION ¶ 1717b1 (3rd ed. 2007); Evans & Salinger, supra note 2, at 75–82. 
 24. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, ¶ 1717d2; Evans & Salinger, supra note 2, at 
52–66. 
 25. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, ¶ 1717b1; BORK, supra note 10, at 379; 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 457–58. 
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(d). Tying as a Means of Protecting Reputation 
In some cases, using the tying product necessitates the use of ac-
companying complementary products. If the complementary products do 
not meet certain criteria and standards, the operating quality of the tying 
product could be reduced, which could have negative implications for its 
reputation. To overcome this concern, firms can tie the complementary 
products to the tying product to ensure that the complementary products 
meet all the requirements necessary for the proper operation of the tying 
product. IBM,26 International Salt,27 and Jerrold Electronics28 all relied 
on this justification for their tying arrangements. 
One might ask why the tying is necessary since it would theoreti-
cally be sufficient for the firm to just inform buyers of the advantages 
and necessity of purchasing all the complementary components from it 
directly. After all, the firm and the purchasers share a common interest in 
the product’s proper operation. The answer may be that the attempt to 
persuade or inform all consumers regarding the need to purchase the 
complementary products from the firm in order for the product to operate 
correctly could be more expensive than tying the products. Also, we can 
assume that there will always be some consumers who will be suspicious 
of the firm’s motivations when it offers to sell them additional prod-
ucts.29 
Additionally, the firm could, as a substitute for the tying, list the 
technical requirements for the complementary products so consumers 
could buy these products in the open market. This alternative, however, 
may prove to be more expensive than the possibility of tying, since it is 
very difficult to ensure that consumers will indeed purchase complemen-
tary products that meet the requirements.30 In addition, there would prob-
ably be many cases in which the consumers themselves would lack the 
required expertise to correctly evaluate the suitability of the competitors’ 
complementary products to the firm’s product requirements.31 
Finally, the tying can be a means of dealing with a “free rider” 
problem, as in the case of Chicken Delight.32 Chicken Delight licensed 
franchisees to operate its restaurants and required them to purchase the 
                                                     
 26. See Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936). 
 27. See Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
 28. See United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff’d per 
curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). 
 29. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, ¶ 1717b; POSNER, supra note 10, at 201. 
 30. See, e.g., Michael A. Salinger, Business Justification Defenses in Tying Cases, in ISSUES 
IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1911, 1923 (Wayne D. Collins ed., 2008). 
 31. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, ¶ 1716a; BORK, supra note 10, at 379–81; 
and VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 14, at 268. 
 32. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971). 
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kitchen equipment and certain supplies.33 This was to keep franchisees 
from buying cheaper, lower quality kitchen equipment and supplies from 
a competing source while relying on the chain’s general reputation for 
their sales.34 
(e). Tying as a Means of Reducing the Risk Involved in Entering the 
Market 
Tying arrangements may serve to reduce the sunk and fixed costs 
required to enter markets, as illustrated in the context of franchising 
agreements.35 Assume that the market value of a franchise license of a 
well-known food chain amounts to $1,000,000. The franchisee is making 
a very dangerous investment. If the venture fails, this large sum will be 
lost. Therefore, the food chain can sell the franchise for a reduced price, 
say $200,000, but tie the franchise to the various products distributed 
through the franchise at prices higher than their market price. Thus, the 
chain reduces the entrepreneur’s sunk and fixed costs, but increases the 
entrepreneur’s variable costs. If the venture fails, the entrepreneur will 
lose only the sunk and some of the fixed costs, which are significantly 
lower in this situation. In contrast, if the venture succeeds, the chain will 
charge the real market value for the franchise through the payments for 
the tied products it supplies to the franchisee. Consequently, the food 
chain reduces the risk involved in entering the market on the entrepre-
neur’s part, as well as the barrier to entry involved in raising the capital. 
In addition, by so doing, the food chain can signal to other potential en-
trepreneurs that the prospects for a new franchise’s success are high be-
cause the food chain can only make a profit if the franchisee succeeds. 
2. Anticompetitive Tying Arrangements 
(a). Tying Serving to Leverage Monopolistic Power 
As evident from the discussion in Part II.A.3 above, in theory, lev-
eraging monopolistic power is possible when: 
• the tied product has a complementary usage but also an inde-
pendent one; 
• the tying closes a significant segment of the tied product mar-
ket; and 
                                                     
 33. See id. 
 34. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 14, at 268. 
 35. See Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 
ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 964–66 (2010). 
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• a significant size efficiency dimension in producing the tied 
product exists. 
In such a scenario, tying that forecloses a significant segment of the 
tied product market harms competing firms’ efficiency. As a result, these 
firms will lose part of their ability to compete, and might have to leave 
the market completely. Thus, the tying firm can obtain monopolistic 
profits from those consumers who purchase only the tied product sepa-
rately. 
While this scenario is possible at the theoretical level, it is not very 
probable. First, the tying firm has to invest the resources necessary to 
manufacture the output required to foreclose the tied product market to 
earn only a limited monopolistic profit for a small part of this manufac-
tured quantity. Second, if the tied product market was competitive prior 
to the tying, then we must assume that at a certain production stage the 
size efficiency is exhausted. From this point onwards, additional produc-
tion is less efficient, making the additional growth in production an effi-
ciency disadvantage. In such a situation, inefficient manufacturing of the 
tied product by the tying firm would reduce its monopolistic profits. 
Third, in order for the leveraging scenario to succeed, there must be high 
barriers to entry to the tied product market; otherwise, new competitors 
would enter this market and lower the tied product’s price. 
The other leverage scenario presented in Part II.A.3 above involves 
leveraging monopolistic power to a “subsequent” product that is ex-
pected to replace the existing product in the future. In this scenario, the 
manufacturer with market power for the current product may tie both 
generations’ products (to the extent that this is possible) in order to lev-
erage or transfer its monopolistic power to the new product.36 However, 
it is not clear how probable this scenario is because it requires the tying 
of two products which serve a similar consumer function (as we assume 
that one product is supposed to replace the other). In addition, competing 
firms may succeed in manufacturing the new generation product before 
the current manufacturer does, and thus win the market. 
(b). Tying as a Means of Raising Market Barriers to Entry 
Tying may raise barriers to entry into the tying or the tied product 
market, since it may compel a new manufacturer to enter both markets 
simultaneously, consequently bearing higher entry costs and risk levels.37 
For example, assume that there is a monopolistic manufacturer of home 
computers that ties the computer to the computer screen it manufactures. 
                                                     
 36. See Carlton & Waldman, supra note 19. 
 37. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 461–62. 
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In addition, assume that prior to the tying, the computer screen market 
was competitive. Because computer screens are used predominantly in 
combination with home computers, the tying drives all competing com-
puter screen manufacturers out of the market. In this situation, a competi-
tor interested in entering the home computer manufacturing market 
would be forced to enter the computer screen manufacturing market as 
well. 
However, there are several considerations that weaken the validity 
of this argument and make it less probable. First, the tying may be effi-
cient. In this case, the raising of barriers to entry would merely constitute 
a side effect to the desirable aims behind the tying.38 Second, if the tying 
is inefficient, the tying firm becomes an easier target for potential com-
petitors because it is easier to compete with an inefficient firm than with 
an efficient one. Assuming that the tying is not efficient, a new computer 
manufacturer and a separate computer screen manufacturer could coordi-
nate with one another, and each enter the relevant market and compete 
more successfully with the monopolistic firm.39 Third, the tying firm 
must invest the resources necessary to manufacture the output required to 
foreclose the tied product market. Supposing that the tied product market 
was competitive prior to the tying, producing all (or most) of the market 
output would probably be less efficient, and therefore would reduce the 
firm’s monopolistic profit. Finally, this scenario requires high barriers to 
entry to both the tying and the tied product markets. 
(c). Evading Price Control 
Tying may be profitable when a monopolistic firm’s prices are sub-
ject to regulatory control so that the firm cannot charge the full optimal 
monopolistic price for the product. The tying of an unregulated product 
enables the monopolistic firm to charge a supra-competitive price for the 
tied product. By so doing, the firm could extract the monopolistic profit 
withheld from it due to price control over the tying product.40 Manufac-
turers of public utilities—electricity, water, telephony, etc.—are best 
suited to use such tying arrangements because, in numerous cases, these 
manufacturers constitute natural monopolies or possess a monopolistic 
                                                     
 38. In this context it should be noted that improving efficiency in general constitutes a barrier 
to entry, because now new firms will also have to increase their efficiency in order to compete. Anti-
trust law should not condemn firms for applying cost-reducing measures, even if by so doing, they 
harm competitors. See, e.g., James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Infer-
ence, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 639, 647 (2005). 
 39. See BORK, supra note 10, at 374–75; HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 462. However, we 
cannot ignore that the need to coordinate entry with another manufacturer involves additional costs 
and risks. 
 40. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 464–66; see also BORK, supra note 10, at 376. 
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status granted by law; in other words, their prices are controlled and the 
demand flexibility is usually low at the price point determined by the 
regulator (consequently the profit could increase significantly if the price 
were raised).41 
Assume that a firm has an exclusive license to provide telephone 
services and that its rates are under supervision. As a result, the firm 
cannot charge the optimal monopolistic price for its services. However, if 
the firm ties the provision of telephone services to the supply of tele-
phones, it can charge a high price for the telephones (assuming that the 
telephones’ price is not controlled), thus increasing its monopolistic prof-
its.42 
(d). Tying as a Means to Prevent Entry into the Tying Product’s Market 
In the past few years, a theory that is a clear outcome of the Mi-
crosoft case43 has been developed, which attempts to demonstrate specif-
ic circumstances in which tying could be anticompetitive. This is a sce-
nario in which the tying prevents entry into the tying product market. 
There are two conditions necessary for this scenario to be realized. First, 
the tied product can only be used with the tying product. Second, by pro-
ducing the tied product, a competitor would be able to enter the tying 
product market in the future. Therefore, if the tying forecloses the tied 
product market, the tying firm could thus prevent the entry of competing 
firms into the tied product market and, subsequently, to the tying product 
market. 
The Microsoft case elucidates this theory. Microsoft was deemed to 
have a monopoly in the market of operating systems for home computers 
(the Windows software), and enjoyed “network externalities” (occurring 
whenever consumers benefit from the increase in the number of consum-
ers).44 Microsoft, it was argued, feared the entry of Netscape into the In-
ternet browser market through Netscape Navigator, which became suc-
cessful and was widely used by consumers. Microsoft allegedly feared 
                                                     
 41. See BORK, supra note 10, at 376. 
 42. Some consider this scenario as a sort of “leveraging,” but in fact, the monopolistic firm 
uses the tying in order to exhaust the monopolistic profit denied in the tying product market. The 
monopolistic firm cannot extract monopolistic profit from both the tying and the tied product mar-
kets. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 14, at 275–80. 
 43. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 44. An example of this phenomenon is the telephone market, in which the more consumers 
who are connected to the network, the greater the benefit each consumer derives from the product. 
Regarding Microsoft, it was argued that developers prefer to develop applications for the operating 
system that has the most users in order to increase their sales. Therefore, the more widespread the 
operating system is, the more applications will be created for it. This, in turn, will increase consumer 
demand for the software. In such markets there is a tendency for the formation of dominance of the 
first firm able to create a network of consumers. See, e.g., VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 14, at 316–17. 
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that Netscape would establish a network of consumers for Navigator that 
would enable it, in the future, to upgrade the Navigator software so it 
could serve as a substitute for Microsoft’s Windows software.45 There-
fore, Microsoft decided to eradicate its potential rival by developing its 
Internet browser, Internet Explorer, and tying it to the Windows soft-
ware. Since computer purchasers did not require two Internet browsers, 
Netscape was rapidly pushed out of the market.46 
(e). Tying Arrangements as a Means of Establishing Oligopolistic 
 Cooperation 
Tying arrangements can facilitate oligopolistic collusion when the 
tying firms require consumers to purchase the tied product at a particular 
price, unless there is another firm offering the product at discount.47 If 
the prevailing market price of the tied product is higher than the competi-
tive price as a result of oligopolistic or cartelistic collusion, then such 
tying may actually help to reinforce the collusion. In fact, the consumers 
will seek out the firms that sell the tied product at discount. As a result, 
the firms producing the tied product will find it increasingly difficult to 
deceive each other, so their collusion will become more robust.48 
This scenario, however, is less relevant to the topic of this Article, 
since it does not necessitate the existence of monopolistic power. There-
fore it is reasonable that the collusion among the tying firms would be 
tested according to the rules dealing with concerted actions, rather than 
according to monopolistic unilateral conduct analysis. 
(f). Tying as a Means for Predatory Behavior 
Predatory pricing may occur when a monopolistic firm sells its 
product at a price lower than its manufacturing cost. Thus, some argue, 
the monopolistic firm may drive competitors out of the market.49 Similar-
ly, the monopolistic firm can sell the tied product at a significant dis-
count, or even for free. If the total price for the bundled products is lower 
than its overall manufacturing cost, then a similar effect to that of preda-
tory pricing may occur.50 
                                                     
 45. See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 53–55. 
 46. See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 14, at 275–80, 332–42; Elhauge, supra note 13, at 417–18. 
 47. For this type of tying arrangement, see, for example, Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 
U.S. 392 (1947) and N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), discussed in more detail 
infra Part II. 
 48. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 463–64. 
 49. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588–90 (1986); see 
also Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226–27 (1993). 
 50. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 403–07. 
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3. Tying Arrangements with Ambiguous Effects 
(a). Tying as a Means of Price Discrimination and Metering the Extent 
 of Product Use 
Monopolistic firms can use tying arrangements to effectively price 
discriminate and extract the maximal price (or close to it) that each of 
their consumers is willing to pay for the product. Thus, the monopolistic 
firm can increase its profit beyond the profit level that it could extract by 
setting a single effective price for all purchasers.51 In principle, there are 
three factors that usually prevent price discrimination: (1) the monopolis-
tic firm usually does not know each consumer’s maximal price because 
consumers have no interest in revealing this information, and an attempt 
to obtain it would, in most cases, be very costly; (2) arbitrage markets; 
and (3) antitrust restrictions on price discrimination.52 
The monopolistic firm can nevertheless price discriminate under the 
following cumulative conditions: (1) the tied product is a complement to 
the tying product and is used in varying amounts with the latter; and (2) 
the usage of the tied product varies for different purchasers in a way that 
positively correlates to the value of the tying product to each purchaser.53 
For example, purchasers of printers who use more ink than other pur-
chasers utilize their printers more frequently and derive more value from 
their use. Therefore, a monopolistic manufacturer of printers can tie the 
sale of the printers to the ink, while charging a lower price for the printer 
(perhaps even the competitive price), but a higher price for the ink. Thus, 
effectively, the manufacturer succeeds in extracting higher prices from 
the consumers who have greater appreciation for the use of the printers 
and make greater use of them. At the same time, consumers whose de-
mand for printers is lower, make less use of the printers, thus consuming 
less ink, and therefore pay an effectively lower price.54 
The effects of these tying arrangements are not necessarily detri-
mental. While, on one hand, this tying allows the monopolistic firm to 
extract the consumer surplus, on the other hand, it could increase the 
output manufactured.55 The greater the quantity produced, the smaller the 
                                                     
 51. See BORK, supra note 10, at 376–77; see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 467. 
 52. See Robinson–Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1936). 
 53. See BORK, supra note 10, at 376–77; see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 467. 
 54. The tying makes it possible to distinguish between consumers who appreciate the product 
more or less. There is no possibility of arbitrage because, formally, all consumers pay the same price 
for the printer and for each unit of ink; therefore, the tying does not violate the restriction on price 
discrimination. 
 55. If the monopolistic firm can sell the product to each consumer according to the maximal 
price the specific consumer is willing to pay, then the firm will produce and sell provided the cost of 
producing one unit of the marginal product is lower than the price the marginal consumer is willing 
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total welfare loss (known as the “dead weight loss”) would be, to the 
point of its complete cessation in cases of perfect effective price discrim-
ination.56 In addition, price discrimination that leads to production in-
crease can also lead to realizing the size efficiency, thus reducing pro-
duction costs.57 
Apart from price discrimination, tying can also serve to measure the 
extent of product use (metering), and accordingly, to determine the prod-
uct’s appropriate price.58 To return to the printer example, let us now as-
sume that the machines are not sold to consumers but leased for a partic-
ular period of time, after which they are returned to the manufacturer. 
The extent of the machines’ use during the leasing period is directly con-
nected to their amortization. The manufacturer can tie the leasing of the 
machines to the ink, and by so doing, the sale of the ink will cover the 
cost of the amortization resulting from the machines’ use. This rationale 
is also valid in scenarios where the manufacturer undertakes to maintain 
and repair the machines, since the manufacturer can return the additional 
costs involved through selling the ink to the lessees.59 The tying in these 
scenarios is intended to set the real price for using the products, so it 
does not have an undesirable economic effect. 
Finally, tying for the purpose of price discrimination is also feasible 
when products are tied using a fixed ratio. In these cases, price discrimi-
nation is possible if purchasers have a different evaluation of the worth 
of different products.60 Such scenarios may exist, for example, in market-
ing films to television stations or distributing them to cinemas.61 Assume 
that two television stations, A and B, are interested in purchasing a li-
cense to show films produced by company Z, which has two films: X and 
Y. Station A is willing to pay $7,000 for film X and $3,000 for film Y, 
while station B is willing to pay $3,000 for film X and $7,000 for film 
Y.62 Also assume that company Z is forbidden from discriminating the 
prices of its films (for example, due to a legal prohibition). In this scenar-
io, company Z can sell the license for showing film X to station A for 
$7,000 and the license to show film Y to station B for $7,000, and thus 
make a total of $14,000. However, if company Z ties both films and 
charges a price of $10,000 for the bundle, it can sell the package to both 
                                                                                                                       
to pay for it. So in cases of perfect price discrimination, the monopolistic firm will produce the com-
petitive quantity and thus increase total welfare. 
 56. For a detailed mathematical explanation, see VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 14, at 271–75. 
 57. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, ¶ 1717b1(B). 
 58. See BORK, supra note 10, at 377–78; HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 470. 
 59. BORK, supra note 10, at 377–78. 
 60. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 165–70 (1968). 
 61. See, e.g., United States v. Lowe’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). 
 62. This numerical example is based, inter alia, on HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 471. 
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stations and make a total of $20,000. The marketing of the package could 
be considered price discrimination since each station evaluates the worth 
of each film differently. In any case, this tying does not necessarily have 
an undesirable effect in terms of total or consumer welfare since it ena-
bles both films to be shown on both stations.63 
(b). Tying as a Means to Eliminate the Double Marginalization Problem 
The double marginalization problem arises when two manufactur-
ers (or service providers) with market power at adjacent vertical stages of 
production set supra-competitive prices independently.64 Assume that a 
product is manufactured by one monopolistic firm and retailed by anoth-
er monopolistic firm. The manufacturing firm will set the monopolistic 
price when it sells the product to the retailer, but the retailer will charge 
additional monopolistic rent from consumers. Hence, the final product’s 
price will be higher than the optimal monopolistic price, while the output 
sold will be lower.65 In this case, the manufacturer can integrate down-
stream to the retailing level by tying the product to its distribution and 
thus eliminate the double markups.66 The double marginalization prob-
lem can also arise in the horizontal context, when two complementary 
products are sold by two monopolistic firms.67 The elimination of the 
double markups increases output and lowers prices, and thus contributes 
to both total and consumer welfare.68 
(c). Extracting the Individual Consumer Surplus When the Consumer 
Purchases More than One Unit of the Tying Product 
Professor Elhauge argues that in certain circumstances a monopo-
listic firm could extract the individual consumer surplus in addition to 
the monopoly surplus.69 This situation could occur when the tying and 
                                                     
 63. For additional references, see BORK, supra note 10, at 377–78; see also VISCUSI ET AL., 
supra note 14, at 269–70. 
 64. See, e.g., Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 
347 (1950). 
 65. See, e.g., id. 
 66. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 472–73. 
 67. See, e.g., Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, Substituting Complements, 2 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 333 (2006). The theory can be traced back to Courno’s analysis of the 
pricing of complementary products produced by monopolies. Id. 
 68. These tying arrangements, however, have the potential of raising barriers to entry into both 
product markets because new competitors would have to enter both markets simultaneously. Alt-
hough the effects of these tying arrangements could, therefore, be argued to be ambiguous, empirical 
evidence, as will be elaborated infra, suggests that their net-effect is probably pro-competitive. See, 
e.g., Cooper et al., supra note 38, at 648. 
 69. See Elhauge, supra note 14, at 407–13. 
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the tied products are complementary products and when the consumer 
buys a certain quantity of the tying product, rather than just one unit.  
Consider the printer market for example, with the tied product be-
ing the ink, where each large business and organization purchases a con-
siderable quantity of printers. The firm could theoretically extract the 
consumer surplus—or at least part of it—by setting a monopolistic price 
for the printers and a higher than competitive price for the ink, while 
granting a quantity discount for any additional ink purchased.70 This is 
based on the assumption that although the firm charges the monopolistic 
price for the printers, individual consumer surplus still remains because 
only the last printer purchased by the consumer creates a benefit worth 
the price.71 In fact, the previous printers purchased grant more gain than 
they cost.72 
The tying in this scenario would not increase the total welfare loss. 
It would, however, harm consumer welfare since it would transfer the 
consumer surplus to the monopolistic firm. It should be noted that in this 
scenario there is no leverage in the classic sense, but rather the extraction 
of the monopolistic surplus and the capturing of the consumer surplus for 
the tying product by the monopolistic firm. 
It could actually be more profitable for the monopolistic firm to set 
the competitive price for the printers, with the price of ink being set at 
the highest level and decreasing gradually with each additional purchase. 
This way, the firm can extract the entire manufacturer surplus as well as 
the entire consumer surplus. In this situation, the market output would 
equal the competitive market output, and thus, despite the consumer wel-
fare loss, the total welfare loss would be eliminated. Therefore, in con-
sideration of the total welfare, this option is preferable to a situation of 
monopolistic pricing without tying.73 
                                                     
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. It seems that the scenario where the monopolistic manufacturer extracts the individual 
consumer surplus is not probable for a number of reasons. First, it requires that consumers have 
similar individual diminishing marginal utility functions for the printers. Otherwise, the tying firm 
would have to implement a separate price plan of the tied product for each and every consumer—a 
task almost impossible to achieve. It would also be difficult to prevent arbitrage of the tied product, 
and perhaps setting different prices for different buyers would not be permitted under the Robinson–
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). Second, the tying firm would have to estimate the consumers’ de-
mand function in order to set the quantity discount plan for the tied product. However, according to 
economic theory, it is very difficult to estimate demand functions. For further discussion on this 
point, see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, ¶¶ 506–07; Dennis W. Carlton, Market Defini-
tion: Use and Abuse, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 3, 10–11 (2007); Robert G. Harris & Thomas 
M. Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated Approach, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984). 
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(d). Tying as a Means to Influence the Input Usage Ratio 
Another theory suggests that tying, in certain circumstances, can in-
fluence the usage ratio of inputs.74 This theory is largely based on the 
circumstances that arose in Kodak, where the respondents, independent 
service organizations, argued that Kodak held monopolistic power in the 
market for spare parts for its photocopiers.75 Respondents also argued 
that Kodak tied the sale of parts to the provision of maintenance and re-
pair services.76 Consequently, this tying forced consumers to use Ko-
dak’s maintenance and repair services if they wished to purchase spare 
parts for their photocopiers. 
The theory proposes that such tying could influence the usage ratio 
of inputs.77 Assume that a manufacturer possesses monopolistic power in 
parts manufacturing for a certain product. The parts are sold to the prod-
uct’s owners combined with a repair service. For the product’s owners, 
the parts and the repair service are complementary as well as substitute 
products, and their use ratio can be varied to some degree. If the price of 
parts increases, it could be more worthwhile to invest in additional repair 
hours in order to fix a broken part instead of replacing it. 
Suppose that in a competitive market, an hour’s labor costs $10, 
while a new part costs $50. Further assume that installing a new part in-
stead of a worn-out part requires two hours of work in addition to the 
cost of the new part (a total of $70), but that with an investment of eight 
hours of labor the worn-out part can be restored (costing $80). In such a 
situation, the owners of the equipment would prefer to order a new part 
and invest two hours in its installation. Since this is the choice in a com-
petitive market, this is the efficient ratio for input usage. 
Assume now that the manufacturer sets the part’s monopolistic 
price at $70 per unit. In such a situation, instead of replacing the worn-
out part at a total cost of $90, it would be more worthwhile for the 
equipment owner to invest eight labor hours in repairing the part, at a 
cost of $80. Therefore, the monopolistic manufacturer should tie the 
parts with the repair service, so that replacing a new part or repairing a 
worn-out part would be performed by the manufacturer (so that it would 
not be possible to repair a worn-out part except through the manufactur-
er). Consequently, the manufacturer can increase the price of labor to 
$12 per hour, and reduce the price of the part to $66, thus making the 
equipment owner prefer to purchase the new part (with a total cost of 
$90: $66 for the part plus two hours of labor costing $24) over repairing 
                                                     
 74. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 460–61. 
 75. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 460–61. 
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the worn-out part, which would now cost $96 (eight hours of labor each 
costing $12). 
Through tying, the manufacturer makes the consumers choose the 
input usage option preferable from the manufacturer’s point of view, so 
she can charge the monopolistic price for the parts. However, by doing 
so she also reestablishes an efficient input usage ratio (a new part plus 
two hours of labor). Thus, the effect of this tying is not necessarily det-
rimental in terms of total welfare. 
C. Tying Arrangements’ Pro-Competitive Efficiency Versus Anticompeti-
tive Potential—Theoretical and Empirical Analysis 
As elaborated in the previous sections, tying arrangements have 
significant pro-competitive efficiency but also anticompetitive potential. 
In order to determine the efficient legal rule for analyzing tying arrange-
ments, we need to determine, to the extent possible, how common the 
beneficial tying arrangements are versus the harmful tying arrangements. 
Theorists of the Chicago and Harvard Schools hold the position that 
the efficient and competitive tying arrangements constitute the lion’s 
share of all tying arrangements.78 This assumption is based on the fact 
that tying arrangements are very common in completely competitive 
markets.79 In such markets, the tying firm cannot “coerce” consumers to 
purchase the tied product. Therefore, presumably, the tying arrangements 
are efficient and beneficial for both the tying firm and the consumer pub-
lic. These efficient results relate to the very tying, rather than to the mar-
ket being competitive or monopolistic. Consequently, if tying arrange-
ments in competitive markets have a significant efficiency potential, then 
this is also the case when the tying takes place in monopolistic markets.80 
In addition, many products are actually made up of a combination of 
several components that were considered separate products in the past. 
This verity supports the assumption regarding the prevalence of efficient 
tying arrangements. In fact, all tying arrangements may have competitive 
potential.81 By contrast, in order for the situations with the anticompeti-
tive potential to occur, special conditions and circumstances must exist, 
some of which are not at all common.82 
                                                     
 78. See, e.g., Evans & Salinger, supra note 2, at 39–40, 89; Salinger, supra note 30, 1911–12, 
1927–28. 
 79. See, e.g., Evans & Salinger, supra note 2, at 39–40, 89; Salinger, supra note 30, 1911–12, 
1927–28. 
 80. See, e.g., Evans & Salinger, supra note 2, at 39–40, 89; Salinger, supra note 30, 1911–12, 
1927–28. 
 81. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, ¶¶ 1717a, 1717c4. 
 82. See, e.g., Evans & Salinger, supra note 2, at 41. The theory that tying arrangements can 
harm competition is fragile “as anticompetitive equilibria emerge only under specific—and difficult 
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Regarding the leverage theory, the Chicago-Harvard theorists as-
sume that leveraging monopolistic power to obtain additional, double 
monopolistic profit is not possible in most scenarios (due to the single 
monopoly profit hypothesis). Only in exceptional situations where spe-
cial circumstances occur can some leverage be possible.83 Thus, based on 
the economic analysis presented above, there is no legal or economic 
justification in determining a general legal presumption against tying 
arrangements. 
Professor Elhauge’s position is that tying arrangements—if we ex-
clude tying arrangements that promote efficiency—are more harmful 
than beneficial.84 He argues that leveraging monopolistic power is possi-
ble in most of the existing scenarios, and in fact, the scenarios where lev-
erage is impossible are the exception rather than the rule.85 However, a 
careful reading of Professor Elhauge’s position reveals that he does not 
deny the premise that among all tying arrangements, including those that 
promote efficiency, the majority are beneficial and pro-competitive.86 
In recent years, growing literature of empirical economic analysis is 
attempting to evaluate the impacts of vertical restraints, which include 
tying arrangements, on consumer and total welfare.87 Although much 
work is still to be done, the results are striking: according to most empir-
ical studies, vertical practices have significant pro-competitive effects, as 
they tend to lower prices and increase output.88 Therefore, the empirical 
evidence supports the theoretical assumption that tying arrangements are 
                                                                                                                       
to verify—assumptions about (among other things) costs, demand, the nature of input contracts, 
conditions of entry, the slope of reaction functions, and the information available to firms.” Cooper 
et al., supra note 39, at 641. In addition, it appears that “minor perturbations to these assumptions 
can reverse the predicted welfare effects of the practice in question.” See Cooper et al., supra note 
38, at 641. 
 83. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, ¶¶ 1716–17; BORK, supra note 10, at 
372–75, 380–81; POSNER, supra note 10, at 197–99; Bowman, supra note 12, at 20–23; Hovenkamp 
& Hovenkamp, supra note 35, at 927. 
 84. See Elhauge, supra note 14, at 400–01, 419–20, 477–78. 
 85. See id. However, we should emphasize that according to Elhauge, leverage can occur even 
when the tying does not close a significant portion of the tied product’s market. In contrast, the theo-
rists of the Chicago and Harvard Schools do not refer to such scenarios as possessing anticompeti-
tive potential. I will elaborate on this matter in Part IV, infra. 
 86. An important issue that Professor Elhauge fails to address in this regard is how to sort out, 
ex ante, those anticompetitive tying arrangements from the majority of efficient arrangements. See, 
e.g., Cooper et al., supra note 38, at 646; Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 
80 AM. ECON. REV. 837, 855–56 (1990). 
 87. See, e.g., Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Re-
straints: Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 391, 
408–09 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2007); Cooper et al., supra note 38, at 648–58. 
 88. See, e.g., Lafontaine & Slade, supra note 87, at 408–09; Cooper et al., supra note 38, at 
648–58. 
2014] Economic & Legal Analysis of Tying Arrangements 21 
likely to be efficient. After reviewing the empirical evidence, Cooper, 
Froeb, O’Brian and Vita conclude: 
Empirical analyses of vertical integration and control have failed to 
find compelling evidence that these practices have harmed competi-
tion, and numerous studies find otherwise. Some studies find evi-
dence consistent with both pro- and anticompetitive effects; but vir-
tually no studies can claim to have identified instances where verti-
cal practices were likely to have harmed competition.89 
As will be elaborated upon in Part IV below, since both theoretical 
and empirical economic research support the assumption that tying ar-
rangements are mostly pro-competitive, there is no justification in deter-
mining an a priori legal presumption against their implementation. 
III. THE CURRENT LAW OF TYING ARRANGEMENTS: A CRITICAL 
REVIEW 
A. The Current Case Law 
Tying arrangements can be analyzed under Sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act, Section 3 of the Clayton Act, and Section 5 of the FTC 
Act.90 In the matter of International Salt, a manufacturer and a patent 
holder of salt machines tied the leasing of its machinery to the sale of the 
salt to be used by the machines.91 The Supreme Court ruled that in order 
to protect competition in tied product markets, tying applied by monopo-
listic firms affecting a “not insubstantial” amount of interstate commerce, 
should be illegal per se.92 Due to the implementation of the per se prohi-
bition, International Salt’s argument, whereby the tying it implemented 
was justified, was rejected.93 
In fact, International Salt could not have charged more than the 
market price for the salt, since according to the agreements, the lessees 
were entitled to purchase salt from any other source offering salt of the 
required standard at lower prices.94 In addition, the Supreme Court ruled 
                                                     
 89. Cooper et al., supra note 38, at 658. 
 90. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 14, 45 respectively. These statutes prohibit, in quite general terms, 
conduct that harms competition and the monopolizing of markets. The common view is that the 
analysis of tying arrangements according to the various statutes is similar and based on the same 
main parameters. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 435, 445–46; see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. 
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11 n.16 (1984). 
 91. See Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
 92. Id. at 396. 
 93. International Salt argued that it was responsible, according to the lease agreements, for 
maintaining and repairing the machines, and by tying the salt to the machines it could guarantee that 
the salt used was of high quality. Id. at 397. 
 94. Id. 
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that International Salt possessed monopolistic power based on the fact 
that its machines were protected by patents, while ignoring un-
contradicted evidence regarding the existence of competing manufactur-
ers.95 
In Northern Pacific, a railway company sold the land adjacent to 
the railway tracks it owned on the condition that the purchasers marketed 
their wares only through its railway lines unless another shipper offered 
lower prices.96 The Supreme Court repeated the holding of International 
Salt and added that the very fact that Northern Pacific was able to force 
upon the purchasers the terms of the tying indicates that it held market 
power.97 
In Jefferson Parish Hosp., the plaintiffs argued that the hospital had 
an exclusive contract with an anesthesiology practice, and thus the hospi-
tal illegally tied the use of its operating rooms to the use of the practice’s 
anesthesiologists.98 The Supreme Court held that the hospital’s market 
share, about 30%, was insufficient for the component of market power 
required in claims of illegal tying, since 70% of the market remained 
available for the plaintiff anesthesiologists.99 The minority opinion (of 
four Justices), however, supported overruling the per se prohibition rule 
and moving to a rule of reason analysis of tying arrangements.100 
In Kodak, the Supreme Court evaluated Kodak’s refusal to sell 
parts for its rapid photocopiers unless the purchaser used Kodak’s 
                                                     
 95. See BORK, supra note 10, at 368; see also POSNER, supra note 10, at 197–98. 
 96. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 3 (1958). 
 97. Id. at 7–8. On this matter, Bork comments that the Supreme Court made the tying arrange-
ment illegal by its very essence. See BORK, supra note 10, at 367–68. If the existence of a tying 
agreement testifies to the tying firm’s market power, and a tying agreement implemented by a firm 
possessing market power is illegal per se, then a tying agreement in itself is in fact illegal per se. In 
fact, it is doubtful whether Northern Pacific possessed market power. Id. In addition, the Supreme 
Court expressed its position, whereby tying arrangements contain no benefit and their entire purpose 
is to harm competition: 
Indeed, “tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competi-
tion.” They deny competitors free access to the market for the tied product, not because 
the party imposing the tying requirements has a better product or a lower price but be-
cause of his power or leverage in another market. At the same time buyers are forced to 
forego their free choice between competing products. For these reasons . . . . [t]hey are 
unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has sufficient economic power with 
respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the 
tied product and a “not insubstantial” amount of interstate commerce is affected. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). This approach suited the economic wisdom of the time, which led to 
a significant concern regarding the leverage of monopolistic power and the marginalization of com-
petitors. Consequently, the Supreme Court hardly took into account tying arrangements’ potential for 
efficiency advantages. A similar position was also expressed by the Supreme Court in Black v. Mag-
nolia Liquor Co., 355 U.S. 24, 25 (1957). 
 98. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
 99. Id. at 27. 
 100. For extensive discussion of this test, see infra Part IV. 
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maintenance and repair services.101 The claim alleged that Kodak was 
thus harming competing suppliers of repair and maintenance services. 
Kodak’s refusal was perceived as a tying whereby Kodak tied the sale of 
the parts for its photocopiers to receiving the repair and maintenance ser-
vices. On this issue, the question was raised whether Kodak could be 
considered to have market power in the secondary parts market when it 
possessed only about 23% of the fast photocopier primary market.102 The 
Court ruled that the absence of market power in the primary market does 
not eliminate the possibility of the existence of market power in the sec-
ondary market.103 
The case of Illinois Tool Works dealt with a tying agreement be-
tween a developer of a patent-protected technology for printing barcodes 
and the developers of printers for printing barcodes on packaging materi-
als.104 According to this agreement, the technology developer granted a 
license to use its technology in order to develop inkjet printers, subject to 
the ink used by the printers being supplied exclusively and continuously 
by the developer. The Supreme Court ruled that the fact that the tying 
product was patent-protected did not in itself indicate the existence of 
market power. Thus, courts must base any ruling regarding illegal tying 
on proving that the tying firm holds actual market power.105 Although the 
per se rule was not at issue, the Supreme Court expressed its doubts as to 
whether such rule is appropriate for analyzing tying arrangements con-
sidering their efficiency potential.106 The Court, however, did not explic-
itly countermand the implementation of the per se rule for tying ar-
rangements. 
The Supreme Court’s position is that tying arrangements carried out 
by monopolistic firms, which affect a “not insubstantial” amount of in-
terstate commerce, are illegal per se. The Court requires proof of the ex-
istence of market power, and rejects the possibility of deducing the exist-
ence of market power from the very fact that the tying product is patent-
protected, or from the very fact that the consumer agreed to the tying 
arrangement. 
However, over the years, several lower court decisions have been 
passed that present greater flexibility in implementing the per se prohibi-
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tion regarding tying arrangements. For instance, the case of Jerrold Elec-
tronics evaluated a tying applied by a manufacturer of systems for re-
ceiving television broadcasts that sold the system only as a complete 
package and refused to sell its components individually.107 The manufac-
turer also tied the sale of the system with its installation and mainte-
nance.108 The manufacturer’s argument was that in cases where the sys-
tem was installed and maintained by other parties, lacking the required 
knowledge, skill, and experience, its function was faulty.109 This was also 
the case when customers attempted to combine components of the sys-
tem with components made by other manufacturers. The court ruled that 
tying the installation and maintenance to the sale of equipment at a time 
when the technology is innovative is reasonable and may be justified, and 
so may be the refusal to sell the components separately; however, when 
the technology is no longer innovative, the per se prohibition will apply 
once more.110 
Another example of tying arrangements that received the approval 
of the courts relates to arrangements known as “full-line forcing.” In the-
se arrangements, a manufacturer requires dealers or concessionaires to 
purchase its full product line, thus preventing them from being free to 
compose a product line from various manufacturers’ products.111 
The best known—and probably the most important—case was that 
in which the D.C. Circuit refused to rule against a tying arrangement in 
the Microsoft case.112 In that case, the tying of the Internet Explorer 
software to the Windows software led to Netscape being pushed out of 
the Internet browser market.113 The district court ruled that since Mi-
crosoft had a monopoly in the operating systems market, by linking its 
operating system software to another product, it violated the per se pro-
hibition set in International Salt.114 
Microsoft appealed, arguing that the software industry is character-
ized by manufacturers that develop new products, obtaining a monopolis-
tic status.115 This status is maintained until a more innovative product is 
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developed, which pushes the previous product out of the market (thus the 
competition is often “for the market” rather than “within the market”).116 
In these markets, the degree of integration of products is relatively high, 
and in fact, many developments actually include a combination of vari-
ous products. Therefore, the argument persists, if dominant firms in these 
markets are forbidden from tying their products, significant harm will be 
caused to this vital branch of the modern world economy.117 The D.C. 
Circuit accepted this argument, and ruled that in the field of software 
development, tying arrangements should be examined under the rule of 
reason rather than the illegal per se rule.118 In its reasoning, the court dis-
tinguished the tying case in Microsoft from tying arrangements examined 
in “old economy” markets for which the Supreme Court set the illegal 
per se rule.119 
B. Criticism of the Illegal Per Se Rule Applied for Tying Arrangements 
The illegal per se rule is supposed to be applied against types of be-
havior that are always or almost always harmful. By the court setting a 
sweeping prohibition, it promotes certainty in the markets as well as de-
terrence against the harmful behavior. In addition, a clear and unambigu-
ous rule saves systemic legal costs because, due to the effective deter-
rence and the certainty, fewer cases reach the courts for review. The cas-
es that still reach the courts will be managed more rapidly, saving re-
sources, since all that is required is proving the existence of the behavior 
without having to analyze its economic effects in the specific circum-
stances.120 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s decision to analyze tying ar-
rangements under the illegal per se rule was based on its understanding 
that this conduct is always harmful (or at least, almost always harmful), 
and that it contains no benefit.121 However, we now discern that the det-
rimental effect of tying arrangements is not as significant as was once 
perceived, and that tying arrangements have significant pro-competitive 
effects. 
This being so, there is wide agreement in academic writing (includ-
ing the Chicago-Harvard Schools and the position of Professor Elhauge) 
that the per se prohibition is not the appropriate rule for analyzing tying 
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arrangements.122 These insights have started permeating the rulings of the 
Supreme Court. As we have seen, in Jefferson Parish Hosp., four Justic-
es supported (albeit in a minority opinion) cancelling the implementation 
of the per se prohibition for examining tying arrangements, and moving 
to implementing the rule of reason.123 A similar approach was expressed 
in Illinois Tool Works, although the Court did not explicitly overrule the 
implementation of the per se rule.124 It appears that today there is an ex-
pectation for the law to be changed, even though it is impossible to esti-
mate when this change will occur. 
IV. THE DESIRABLE LAW 
This Part will first review the different legal rules for analyzing ty-
ing arrangements, and then present the various tying scenarios and the 
appropriate legal rule for each of them in accordance with the modern 
economic analysis presented in Part II above. 
A. The Different Legal Rules for Analyzing Tying Arrangements 
1. The Per Se Rules 
As mentioned, the illegal per se rule is intended to prevent activity 
that is, in its vast majority, harmful. In contrast, the legal per se rule is 
based upon an absolute legal presumption whereby a particular behavior 
is always, or at least almost always, efficient and pro-competitive. There-
fore, to prevent unnecessary litigation and to prevent over-deterrence, the 
behavior is sweepingly permitted. The implementation of this rule to ty-
ing arrangements was proposed by Professor Bork—who is associated 
with the Chicago School125—but did not receive widespread support due 
to the anticompetitive potential of tying arrangements.126 
2. The “Quasi-Per Se” Rule 
The main advocate of the “quasi-per se” rule is Professor 
Elhauge.127 This rule is based on the assumption that tying arrangements 
do have beneficial potential, but also have significant harmful and anti-
competitive potential. However, in Elhauge’s opinion, the balance tends 
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toward the negative potential when the beneficial arrangements are ex-
cluded.128 Therefore, Elhauge proposes that the plaintiff will first be re-
quired to prove the existence of the tying firm’s significant market pow-
er, and also that the tying leads to “not insignificant” closing of the tied 
product market.129 If the plaintiff succeeds at this onus, the presumption 
of the arrangement’s illegality will prevail. In order to negate this pre-
sumption, the tying firm will have to prove a legitimate justification of 
efficiency.130 It is important to note that Professor Elhauge supports ap-
plying the test only in tying scenarios in which the ratio of the tied prod-
ucts is not fixed.131 Since it is very complicated to prove efficiency justi-
fications (due to the complex economic analysis required), the quasi-per 
se rule grants a significant advantage to the plaintiff.132 As stated above, 
such an advantage can be justified if, in fact, most of the tying arrange-
ments were anti-competitive. If this assumption is not realistic, then the 
rule will lead to harming desirable and beneficial arrangements. 
3. The Rule of Reason 
The rule of reason analysis is widely used in antitrust law. It is im-
plemented in scenarios where a certain behavior can be beneficial and 
competitive in certain circumstances, but harmful and anticompetitive in 
other circumstances, and where there is no clear bias in favor of the anti-
competitive and harmful scenarios.133 In principle, this legal rule exam-
ines each case individually, in depth, by conducting an extensive eco-
nomic analysis regarding the examined conduct’s competitive effects.134 
According to the rule of reason, the plaintiff at first must prove that 
the defendant’s conduct harms competition. For this purpose, the plain-
tiff must present the theory that shows that competition could be harmed 
as a result of the tested behavior; demonstrate that the theory suits the 
circumstances of the case at hand; and prove that the threat to competi-
tion is significant. Should the plaintiff succeed in this onus, then in the 
second stage, the defendant must prove an efficiency justification for its 
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conduct.135 If the defendant does so, the burden shifts back to the plain-
tiff, who must prove that in the final outcome, the conduct’s anti-
competitive effects outweigh the beneficial effects. Alternatively, the 
plaintiff must prove that similar efficiency benefit can be achieved 
through other means that are less harmful to competition.136 
The rule of reason, in comparison to the quasi-per se rule, grants a 
clear advantage to the defendant, since there is a basic difficulty in prov-
ing, as a preliminary matter, harm to competition or to consumers. Such 
proof requires a complex economic analysis that frequently fails to result 
in clear and convincing conclusions. Therefore, to a large extent, the pre-
liminary classification regarding the rule that should be applied in ana-
lyzing tying arrangements—the quasi-per se or the rule of reason—has 
great importance in determining the final outcome of the process. 
It is important to note that some of the theorists of the Harvard and 
Chicago Schools propose a distinctive application of the rule of reason in 
circumstances in which the tying arrangement forecloses a significant 
segment of the tied product market. This application is very similar to the 
application of the quasi-per se rule. I will elaborate about this application 
in this Part below. 
B. Classifying the Appropriate Rule for the Various Tying Scenarios 
1. Tying Scenarios in Which the Use of the Tied Products is in Fixed 
Proportions, and That Do Not Lead to Closing a Significant Segment of 
the Tied Product Market—Adopting the Legal Per Se Rule 
In tying arrangements in which the products are used in fixed pro-
portions and that do not lead to closing a significant segment of the tied 
product market, the single monopoly profit hypothesis prevails. In these 
circumstances, there is no significant potential for harming competition. 
It is not possible to leverage the monopolistic power to the tied product 
market, to increase the monopolistic profit for the tying product (other 
than by increasing efficiency), or to raise entry barriers into the mar-
kets.137 As a consequence, according to the theorists of the Chicago and 
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Harvard Schools and Professor Elhauge, these tying arrangements should 
be legal per se.138 
2. Tying Arrangements in which the Products are not Used in Fixed Pro-
portions and That Do Not Lead to Significant Closing of the Tied Prod-
uct Market—Adopting the Legal Per Se Rule 
Tying arrangements in which the products are not used in fixed 
proportions and that do not lead to a significant closing of the tied prod-
uct market are those currently at the heart of the controversy between the 
Chicago-Harvard Schools’ theorists and Professor Elhauge. According to 
the Chicago-Harvard Schools’ theorists, such scenarios do not possess 
anticompetitive potential, and thus do not require antitrust enforce-
ment.139 In contrast, according to Professor Elhauge, there is a significant 
harmful potential in these tying scenarios, and therefore he proposes ap-
plying the quasi-per se rule.140 
Leading Chicago-Harvard School theorists argue that the main goal 
of antitrust is to promote total welfare.141 Professor Elhauge holds a dif-
ferent position, whereby the main purpose of antitrust law is to promote 
consumer welfare, even at the expense of total welfare.142 For our pur-
poses, this controversy can be expressed in the tying scenario intended 
for effective price discrimination.143 On the one hand, this sort of tying 
arrangement leads to the tying firm extracting a significant portion of the 
consumer surplus, but on the other hand, it may enable the tying firm to 
increase output, and thus total welfare. 
Professor Elhauge argues that the consumer welfare should be pre-
ferred for a number of reasons. First, monopolistic profit achieved 
through a tying arrangement would be dissipated by the cost of the com-
petition to achieve the market power in the first place.144 Second, when a 
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certain behavior increases the firm’s profit, in most cases the firm can 
ensure that part of the profit is diverted to consumer welfare. Therefore, 
the standard of consumer welfare would lead to any total welfare of the 
behavior being transferred also to the consumer’s advantage. In contrast, 
if consumer welfare cannot be increased, then this probably means that 
the behavior has no contribution to total welfare either.145 Third, in the 
current global reality, a standard of protecting consumers would provide 
an appropriate response to importing countries (meaning “consumers”) 
against their exploitation by “producing” countries.146 Finally, the con-
sumer standard, according to Elhauge, advances distributional justice 
since the consumers are usually less wealthy than the manufacturers.147 
Therefore, an increase of wealth of consumers would grant them greater 
benefit than would be obtained by the wealthier manufacturer firms, 
based on the assumption of the declining marginal benefit of wealth.148 
To contrast, leading Chicago and Harvard School theorists promote 
the total welfare standard and present several strong arguments in its fa-
vor. First, choosing between different groups—such as consumers versus 
manufacturers—is essentially a political choice, and should be made in 
the political arena rather than the regulatory/legal arena.149 Second, in 
response to the argument about promoting distributional justice, they 
argue that the assumption that the consumers are less wealthy than the 
manufacturers is not necessarily established.150 There are some wealthy 
consumers and there are also shareholders of manufacturing firms who 
are not wealthy at all. In addition, most of the transactions—in fact, al-
most all transactions not involving the end consumers—are between 
firms (meaning between a firm producing the product and a firm pur-
chasing the product), and there is no justification in preferring some 
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firms over others.151 Because we cannot examine each case individually, 
it is appropriate to assume that all parties deserve wealth equally. It is 
preferable to support an aggregate approach, through which it would be 
possible in many cases to compensate the losing parties. Even if we ac-
cept the assumption that the resources should be distributed according to 
criteria of “justice,” antitrust law is still not the appropriate means for 
this end. Instead, we should prefer the tools of taxation and subsidies 
given to the weaker groups because antitrust law does not distinguish 
between poor or wealthy consumers, or between poor and wealthy manu-
facturers. There is no justification in wealthy consumers receiving the 
same benefit as poor consumers.152 
Third, allowing monopolistic firms to exploit their market power 
actually benefits consumers in the long run, so long as competing firms 
are not restrained, as we assume is the case at hand. Despite the short-
term loss from provisionally higher prices, the opportunity to charge 
those higher prices encourages competing firms to invest in innovative 
products that are essential to a vibrant economy. It is therefore better to 
promote long-term efficiency that will also lead to future lower prices 
than to grant priority to the consumer standard, which aims at lowering 
the short-term price.153 “In fact, inefficient tying that does not restrain 
competitors would necessarily boost competition in the tying product 
market even more than straight monopoly pricing.”154 If the tying ar-
rangement does not benefit consumers, then they “would surely view 
tying as worse than straight monopoly pricing, creating an enhanced op-
portunity for competitors to erode the tying firm’s market power by in-
novating better products.”155 
Fourth, the purpose of antitrust law is to deal with conduct harming 
competition, and not with conduct aimed at exhausting monopolistic 
profits.156 Therefore, when a monopolistic firm ties products under the 
circumstances discussed here, it can at most increase its monopolistic 
profits in the tying product market. It cannot affect the competitive struc-
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ture of the tied product market. This position is based on the Court’s de-
termination that no antitrust restriction should be imposed upon setting a 
monopolistic price, and, in fact, a monopolistic manufacturer is entitled 
to set as high a monopolistic price as it desires.157 
Because, in my view, the arguments for the total welfare standard 
are more established and consistent with the core antitrust doctrines, ty-
ing arrangements that do not foreclose the tied product market should be 
legal per se. Moreover, even if we accepted Professor Elhauge’s argu-
ments in favor of the consumer standard, the quasi-per se rule would still 
not be appropriate for analyzing the tying arrangements discussed here. 
Given that there are no grounds for assuming that these tying arrange-
ments’ anticompetitive potential outweighs their pro-competitive poten-
tial, there is no justification in implementing any legal presumption 
against them. 
3. Tying Scenarios Leading to a Significant Closing of the Tied Product 
Market—Adopting the Rule of Reason 
Tying arrangements leading to a significant closing of the tied 
product market have the greatest anticompetitive potential, as they can 
affect both the tied and the tying product markets. Within these arrange-
ments, it could be possible to leverage monopolistic power (at least in 
theory) and raise barriers to entry to the tied as well as the tying product 
markets. For these reasons, both the theorists of the Chicago-Harvard 
Schools and Professor Elhauge propose imposing restrictions on such 
tying arrangements. In fact, the two approaches are quite similar in this 
context. However, as I will argue below, a different and more lenient 
approach towards tying arrangements should be applied. 
Professor Elhauge proposes applying the rule of reason when the 
tying of products, in fixed proportions, forecloses a significant segment 
of the tied product market, and applying the quasi-per se rule if the prod-
ucts are not tied in fixed proportions.158 Theorists of the Harvard School, 
and some theorists of the Chicago School, propose applying the rule of 
reason to all tying arrangements that close the tied product market.159 
However, according to their implementation of the rule, it would be suf-
ficient for the plaintiff to prove the foreclosure of the tied product market 
in order to meet the onus of proving the conduct’s anticompetitive poten-
tial.160 Prominent theorists of the Harvard School even suggest that prov-
ing a closing of 30% of the tied product market would suffice for this 
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purpose.161 It is apparent that the proposed implementation of the rule of 
reason is quite similar to that of the quasi-per se rule suggested by Pro-
fessor Elhauge. 
In fact, there is no basis—either empirical or theoretical—for the 
two approaches presented whereby the onus of proof should be shifted. 
While closing a significant segment of the tied product market strength-
ens the anticompetitive potential of the tying arrangements, it does not 
diminish their pro-competitive efficiency potential.162 It can even be ar-
gued that the foreclosing of the tied product market is a prerequisite for 
eliminating double markup distortions, which is a pro-competitive ef-
fect.163 Applying a presumption against tying arrangements in certain 
scenarios assumes that their anticompetitive potential outweighs their 
pro-competitive potential. However, this assumption has no anchor either 
in theoretical writing or in empirical research.164 
Arguably, shifting the burden of proof could be justified, even if ty-
ing arrangements tend to be pro-competitive, if it turns out that type II 
errors are much more costly than type I errors.165 It means, in this con-
text, that the costs from failing to challenge anticompetitive tying ar-
rangements (type II error) outweigh the costs from challenging pro-
competitive tying arrangements (type I error).166 Because economic theo-
ry as well as empirical evidence suggest that tying arrangements are like-
ly to be welfare enhancing, antitrust enforcement can be justified only by 
relatively significant type II error costs.167 However, there is no support, 
theoretically or empirically, that type II error costs outweigh the type I 
error costs. On the contrary, an argument can be made supporting the 
opposite assumption, as Professor Easterbrook observes: 
If the court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits 
may be lost for good. Any other firm that uses the condemned prac-
tices faces sanctions in the name of stare decisis, no matter the ben-
efits. If the court errs by permitting a deleterious practice, though, 
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the welfare loss decreases over time. Monopoly is self-destructive. 
Monopoly prices eventually attract entry.168 
In the absence of any support, legal or economic, no presumption 
should be made against a common business conduct with a significant 
pro-competitive efficiency potential. This is particularly true given the 
suggestion of prominent scholars to consider a closing of 30% of the tied 
product market as sufficient for transferring the onus to the defendant.169 
Therefore, this Article proposes requiring the plaintiff to bear the 
preliminary onus of proof that the tying arrangement has significant anti-
competitive potential before the defendant is required to prove a legiti-
mate efficiency justification.170 Thus, the plaintiff will have to prove, 
first, that the tying arrangement leads to a significant closing of the tied 
product market, such that it prevents competitors from achieving econo-
mies of scale. In addition, the plaintiff would have to prove the existence 
of the circumstances required for the anticompetitive effects to take 
place, as discussed in Part II above.171 
For instance, if the plaintiff claims that the tying arrangement leads 
to the leverage of monopolistic power, as discussed in Part II.B.2(a) 
above, she would have to prove that such limited leverage could be prof-
itable to the tying firm. To be profitable, the added monopolistic rent has 
to outweigh the costs of setting up the manufacturing infrastructure nec-
essary for producing the entire tied product market output (or most of it). 
As previously stated, it is reasonable to assume that such production 
probably exceeds the size efficiency range. In addition, the plaintiff 
would have to prove the existence of high barriers to entry to the tied 
product market. 
If, for instance, the plaintiff claims that the tying arrangement was 
intended to raise the barriers of entry into the tied product market, as dis-
cussed in Part II.B.2(b) above, then she must prove: (a) that the tying 
does indeed make the entry less likely;172 (b) that there are high barriers 
                                                     
 168. See Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1984); see also 
Cooper et al., supra note 38, at 661; Fred S. McChesney, Talking ‘Bout My Antitrust Generation: 
Competition for and in the Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L. J. 1401, 1401, 1412 (2003). 
 169. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 23, ¶ 1729e2. 
 170. See also Cooper et al., supra note 38, at 660–61 (suggesting that “given strong priors that 
vertical restraints are efficient, enforcement against vertical restraint should be rare absent direct 
evidence of harm to welfare.”); Salinger, supra note 30, at 1928 (“A more appropriate legal standard 
would be one that embodies a strong presumption that tying is efficient and places a heavy burden 
on plaintiffs to demonstrate that its net effect is to cause consumer harm.”). 
 171. These conditions could be very difficult to verify in practice. See Evans & Salinger, supra 
note 2, at 41; and Cooper et al., supra note 38, at 661–62. 
 172. If the tying does not promote efficiency, paradoxically, it could encourage entry, as poten-
tial competitors would prefer to compete with a monopolistic firm operating inefficiently. However, 
if the tying is efficient, then naturally the plaintiff will find it more difficult to challenge it. 
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to entry to both the tying and tied product markets; and (c) that such a 
strategy could be profitable given the high costs involved in incorporat-
ing the required manufacturing infrastructure,173 and when it is probable 
(as in the leverage example), that production of such an extent would 
exceed the size efficiency range.174 
If the plaintiff meets this preliminary onus of proof, the requirement 
would be passed to the defendant to prove the existence of significant 
efficiency justifications. Accordingly, only if the defendant fails to prove 
the efficiency justification would it be determined that the tying ar-
rangement violated antitrust law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is currently a gap between the economic theory and the pre-
vailing law regarding tying arrangements. These arrangements, which 
used to be considered essentially harmful, have been shown to possess 
limited potential for harm—certainly less significant potential than was 
previously thought. Moreover, tying arrangements have been shown to 
hold the potential for great and essential benefit. This Article has pre-
sented the main accepted modern economic insights, and has proposed 
the appropriate legal rules for analyzing the various tying scenarios. 
When the tying arrangement does not lead to a significant closing of the 
tied product market, and so it does not affect this market’s competitive 
structure, the legal per se rule should be applied. In contrast, when the 
tying arrangement leads to a significant closing of the tied product mar-
ket, the rule of reason test should be applied, but not in the format that 
assumes that tying arrangements in these scenarios are harmful. Rather, it 
should be applied in a format that requires the plaintiff to prove the ex-
istence of real potential to harm competition significantly. If the exist-
ence of harmful potential is proven, the defendant will have to prove a 
significant efficiency justification. Then, the onus returns to the plaintiff 
to show that the anticompetitive potential of the tying outweighs its pro-
competitive potential. 
                                                     
 173. Taking under consideration that the tying firm would have to produce the majority (if not 
all) of the tied product market output in order to foreclose this market. 
 174. For a discussion, not necessarily exhaustive, of the additional circumstances required for 
the anticompetitive tying scenarios to be realized, see supra Part II.B.2. 
